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Abstract 
Traditional public key cryptographic methods provide access control to sensitive 
data by allowing the message sender to grant a single recipient permission to read the 
encrypted message.  The Need2Know® system (N2K) improves upon these methods by 
providing role-based access control.  N2K defines data access permissions similar to 
those of a multi-user file system, but N2K strictly enforces access through cryptographic 
standards.  Since custom hardware can efficiently implement many cryptographic 
algorithms and can provide additional security, N2K stands to benefit greatly from a 
hardware implementation.  To this end, the main N2K algorithm, the Key Protection 
Module (KPM), is being specified in VHDL.  The design is being built and tested 
incrementally: this first phase implements the core control logic of the KPM without 
integrating its cryptographic sub-modules.  Both RTL simulation and formal verification 
are used to test the design.  This is the first N2K implementation in hardware, and it 
promises to provide an accelerated and secured alternative to the software-based system.  
A hardware implementation is a necessary step toward highly secure and flexible 
deployments of the N2K system. 
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1 Introduction 
 This thesis addresses the hardware implementation of a new cryptographic 
system.  The system itself aims to provide new flexibility in secure communication over 
insecure networks, and the implementation provides the means of successfully realizing 
the system under practical constraints.  This implementation is the first attempt to render 
the core system algorithm in hardware.   
This introduction examines the need for the new algorithm and discusses the 
practical considerations involved in implementation.  Chapter 2 presents a study of 
relevant previous work.  Chapter 3 gives a general overview of the algorithm and the 
design process.  Chapter 4 presents the design implementation, and chapter 5 presents a 
discussion of the results.  Finally, chapter 6 summarizes, gives conclusions, and presents 
possibilities for future work. 
1.1 The Growing Need for Computer Security 
With the increased reliance of governments, businesses, and individuals on 
information technology, the need for computer security is continually increasing.  
Modern computing practices allow data to exist in complex multi-user environments, to 
be transmitted via insecure public networks, and to be sent across organizational 
boundaries.  As technology enables these new workflows, it also creates a need for new 
means to control sensitive information (Stallings, 2003). 
1.1.1 Example 1: Military Communications 
One area in need of new security measures is military communications.  To pull 
an example from present-day politics, the U.S. is currently operating in Iraq, and its chief 
ally is Great Britain.  A number of other countries, including Japan, have also contributed 
to the effort.  If the U.S. decides that it is going to launch an offensive in one particular 
area, it needs to make sure that the allies and peace-keepers are aware of the attack, but it 
also needs to keep this information from the insurgents.  Additionally, it might want to 
send in-depth operational details to the allies that should not be divulged to the peace-
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keepers, or it might want to selectively deliver information only to particular allies.  The 
current methods require that individual, direct, secure communication links be established 
with the involved parties.  Maintaining so many secure links is a complicated and 
expensive operation, and a better solution should be possible.   
1.1.2 Example 2: Corporate Communications 
Another area that can make use of new security measures is corporate 
communications.  Like military communications, corporate communications can involve 
multiple communicating entities who need access to different levels of information.  For 
instance, the vice president of the company might want to distribute the specifications for 
a new product.  To his manager, he might want to distribute financial forecasts along with 
functional specifications and packaging details.  The manager might then pass along the 
functional specifications to his workers and outsource the packaging to a second 
company.  Certainly, the second company should not see the functional specifications or 
the financial forecasts.  While no harm is done if the employees see the packaging details, 
that is probably useless information for them.  Traditionally a number of documents 
would be created by the vice-president, and he would have to deliver the documents to 
the manager with explicit instructions as to their security levels.  But, this imposes the 
task of managing the documents on the manager, and there should be an easier, automatic 
way to keep track of which parties need which information.   
1.1.3 Example 3: Multi-user PC File System 
A third area that stands to benefit from new security measures is the multi-user 
PC.  If the PC is running any modern multi-user operating system, then individual users 
can easily set permission levels to restrict access to their files.  The problem with this is 
that those permissions are, in general, enforced by the operating system which assigns 
them.  With relative ease, anyone with access to the physical machine can bypass the 
operating system and read the data stored therein.  The operating system can also be 
bypassed by an application that takes advantage of known system weaknesses.  Several 
available software packages make use of encryption to protect the stored data, but in 
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general they remove the fine-grained control that the operating system gives and limit 
access to a single user with the correct password.  More subtle levels of access should be 
available with the same level of security, but there are few products that currently fill this 
niche. 
1.2 Need2Know System 
The Need2Know System was developed to address the deficiencies of other 
security systems and to meet the growing information security needs of complex 
organizations (InfoAssure N2K, 2004).  Need2Know specifies an algorithm for data 
processing that includes the following key features: 
• Centralized Role-based Access Control, 
• Information Centric Security, and 
• Cryptographic Enforcement. 
1.2.1 Centralized Role-based Access Control 
Centralized role-based access control describes the management and permissions 
model used by Need2Know.  In this model, the top-level unit is a domain.  The domain 
can be logically divided into a set of roles based on the flow of information within the 
domain, and members belong to one or more domains.  A management officer oversees 
the domain, and adding a member means issuing credentials to the member to bind him to 
his associated roles.  With the credentials he gains access to pertinent information, and 
the management officer can revoke or update the credentials in accordance with changing 
roles.  Since management is centralized, control is maintained over the domain 
membership, and the system is scalable to very large organizations. 
When Need2Know information is created or modified, its author can select a 
number of credentials to limit the readership.  Selection can be as fine or as broad as 
desired, allowing the author to target any number of recipients, from a single individual 
up to the entire system.  Valid permission levels are write-only and read/write, and 
furthermore they can be time-based, limiting the readership to members who have been 
with the system for some set amount of time.   
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1.2.2 Information Centric Security 
The mantra behind Need2Know is that since information needs to be protected, 
security practices should be implemented on the information itself.  This is known as 
Information Centric Security, and it improves upon previous practices that relied on 
physical security of networks and computer systems to protect data (InfoAssure About, 
2005).  Physical security still plays an important role in a total security scheme, but tying 
information security to the data objects themselves liberates the communication and 
computer systems from strict requirements.  Using Information Centric Security 
practices, public networks and public information processing systems can often be used 
in the place of expensive and unruly dedicated access resources.  Since Need2Know is 
infrastructure independent, it can ideally allow secure access to information and services 
nearly anytime and anywhere (InfoAssure Products, 2005). 
1.2.3 Cryptographic Enforcement 
Central to implementing Information Centric Security are the concepts of 
cryptography, which allow data to be mathematically obscured.  By making use of 
cryptographic algorithms, data can be protected independent of the system in which it 
resides.  Through the process of encryption, the original plaintext can be altered to 
produce coded ciphertext.  With the correct digital credentials, it is possible to decrypt the 
ciphertext and obtain the original plaintext, but without them decryption can be 
computationally infeasible (Stallings, 2003).   
With cryptographic enforcement, encrypted data can securely cross organizational 
boundaries, insecure channels, and various processing environments before being 
received and decrypted by its intended recipient(s).  In contrast, a system that relies on a 
secure environment to enforce its access only provides information security within that 
environment.  Once the data is passed outside of the trusted realm, for instance by being 
moved to a floppy disk or by being sent on the public internet, the plaintext can be 
viewed by any interested party. 
The Need2Know system can only be as secure as its underlying cryptography, so 
choosing good algorithms is a key concern.  In the security community, cryptographic 
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algorithms are heavily scrutinized to determine their level of security.  In the U.S., a 
number of organizations publish cryptographic standards that have been approved for 
widespread public (government) and private (corporate) use.  The main standards bodies 
are the National Institute of Standards (NIST) and American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), and the Need2Know system makes use of their published standards wherever 
they are applicable. 
1.2.4 Enabling New Capabilities 
With the aforementioned features, the Need2Know system gives new information 
security capabilities to its users, enabling more-flexible access to shared secure 
information.  With regards to the military communications example, wartime updates of 
U.S. troop movements could be sent over public wireless or internet channels, even being 
broadcast at a known frequency and time.  Despite the fact that the transmission could be 
intercepted by any party, only those nations with the correct permission levels would be 
able to access the privileged information.  For the corporate communications example, 
one set of documents could be distributed with each document being protected against 
unauthorized use.  Then, even if the outsourced company or the engineers received the 
marketing data, they would not be able to read it.  Finally, with regards to the multi-user 
PC example, files would be assigned permissions based on Need2Know rather than the 
operating system.  The same fine-grain access permissions would be possible, but in 
cases when the operating system was replaced, bypassed, or forgotten, the files would 
still maintain their intended access controls.   
1.3 Implementation Considerations 
In Need2Know, the main algorithm resides in the Key Protection Module (KPM).  
The KPM makes use of the various cryptographic standards in order to encrypt and 
decrypt Need2Know data.  Therefore, each Need2Know member needs an 
implementation of the KPM in order to interact with the system.  Need2Know, by design, 
has great potential to allow flexible, secure access to information.  However, to realize 
this potential, the implementation must meet several requirements: 
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• low time-to-market, 
• high-throughput, 
• low power, 
• low cost, 
• feature flexibility, and  
• implementation security. 
In making implementation choices it is necessary to evaluate the tradeoffs among these 
metrics. 
1.3.1 Low Time-to-Market 
Design-time is critical because Need2Know aims to meet a current need, not a 
need that is only projected to exist in the future.  With a fast turn-around, development 
costs for the implementation are kept down.  The sooner Need2Know is ready to be 
deployed, the sooner it can benefit its users and the sooner its developers can earn a 
return on their investment. 
1.3.2 High-Throughput 
High-throughput refers to how quickly the implementation can encrypt and 
decrypt information.  The two contributing factors to throughput will be the number of 
recipient roles and the size of the data to be encrypted.  For every additional recipient 
role, an extra set of cryptographic operations will need to be performed, and increasing 
data size will necessarily extend the length of the encryption/decryption operation.  
Regardless of the source of the latency, a processing time that is too great negates the 
usefulness of the device.  Often, the need to share information is time-critical, many users 
need to be targeted, and large amounts of data need to be transferred. 
1.3.3 Low Power 
Low power becomes of interest when taking into account mobile, battery-life 
constrained devices such as radios or laptop computers.  For these devices, a power-
intensive implementation can limit or even remove usefulness of the implementation.  
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Additionally, power consumption generates heat, and the need for active cooling can 
radically affect a device’s design and viability (Adams, 2002).  Certainly, if the 
implementation has the power and cooling requirements of a modern desktop CPU, then 
the mobility and installation requirements are limited. 
1.3.4 Low Cost 
A low product cost is a concern of any commercial device, and the KPM is no 
exception.  With a high cost, maximum performance can be realized, but the product 
might be unaffordable.  Conversely, an ultra low cost bolsters widespread distribution, 
but low performance might make the product undesirable.  Upfront non-recurring 
engineering costs (NREs) can be an important factor along with per-unit costs, and the 
relative tradeoffs need to be evaluated in the light of the business plan (Adams, 2002).   
1.3.5 Feature Flexibility 
Feature flexibility is an important consideration given that during the design cycle 
or after deployment the changes might be required in the implementation.  Since the 
Need2Know specification is relatively new, it is reasonably likely that changes or 
clarifications in the specifications will be issued.  Also, the core cryptographic algorithms 
are continually being analyzed and refined, so it is important to be able to support new 
developments to maintain the security of the implementation. 
1.3.6 Implementation Security 
Even though the Need2Know algorithm uses cryptographic standards to provide 
strong security during data transmission, data and secret information can exist in 
relatively unprotected forms within the implementation.  If a potential attacker believes 
that the implementation is a weak point in the security scheme, he will focus his efforts 
on attacking it.  While it is virtually impossible to guarantee security of a device, a 
number of implementation decisions can improve the device’s physical security. 
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1.4 Technology Tradeoffs 
Three technologies were considered for this implementation: software running on 
a general purpose CPU, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), and Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs).  With any engineering design, it is difficult to find a 
single technology that optimizes every constraint.  The relative tradeoffs are evaluated 
against each other in the following subsections. 
1.4.1 Low Time-to-Market 
Software provides the fastest migration from conceptualization to 
implementation.  Software easily leverages existing libraries of functionality and can be 
quickly debugged and deployed on off-the-shelf PC hardware.  FPGA and ASIC designs 
can also make use of existing designs, but integrating legacy functionality generally 
requires more extensive testing and debugging.  Also, since FPGA and ASIC 
developments take place at a lower level of abstraction than software development, 
development and debug cycles are longer.  ASIC prototyping further entails a multi-week 
to multi-month wait while the device is fabricated, whereas FPGAs designs offer rapid 
prototyping. 
1.4.2 High-Throughput 
While either large number of recipient roles or large message size can dominate 
processing time, both of the involved operations make heavy use of cryptography.  
Software is relatively inefficient when dealing with cryptographic algorithms, but those 
algorithms can be very efficiently implemented in hardware.  Typically, FPGAs and 
ASICS can offer an order of magnitude increase in performance compared to general 
purpose processors.  For a given design, ASICs are generally able to offer higher clock 
speeds than FPGAs, so their scalability will also be noticeably higher. 
1.4.3 Low Power 
Modern general purpose processors needed to run software employ high clock 
frequencies in the gigahertz (109) range, whereas FPGAs and ASICs use lower clock 
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frequencies of tens or hundreds of megahertz (106).  Hardware power dissipation scales 
linearly with clock frequency, and ASIC implementations fully realize this potential 
power savings: they can be expected to consume 1/10th to 1/100th the power of their 
general purpose counterparts.  FPGAs, on the other hand, are unable to realize low power 
implementations due to higher transistor counts and higher internal losses.  While their 
power usage is much less than that of a mainstream desktop CPU, it is often still too high 
for power-conscious mobile applications. 
1.4.4 Low Cost 
While high-end general purpose processors are extremely expensive, their 
embedded counterparts are priced much more reasonably.  As these processors are off-
the-shelf components, they have no additional custom mask costs.  FPGAs offer the same 
performance as a much more expensive general purpose CPU at a lower per-unit cost 
while still remaining free of extra costs.  ASICs, while offering the best per-unit cost of 
the three, have associated mask costs that can soar into the millions-of-dollars range.  
ASICs thus offer the lowest total cost only when amortizing mask costs over high 
production volumes. 
1.4.5 Feature Flexibility 
Software offers the ultimate in feature flexibility: most feature updates can be 
instituted with an update to the code.  Thus, changes can be made throughout the 
development cycle and after deployment.  In a similar manner, FPGA designs can be 
updated by altering the configuration memory, though it is possible that the new features 
cannot be accommodated by the available logic resources.  In contrast to software and 
FPGA implementations, ASICs provide absolutely no feature flexibility, even during the 
design debug phase.   
1.4.6 Implementation Security 
From a security standpoint, a software implementation is the least secure.  In an 
OS environment, there are a number of opportunities for rogue programs and users to 
snoop on activity of other programs and data.  Even in a limited software environment, 
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the system is more open to attack through altered programs or through analysis of the 
well-understood hardware.  The dedicated hardware of FPGAs and ASICs provides an 
extra layer of security since access to the computing resources can be more closely 
controlled.  FPGAs, allowing reconfiguration, have a potential weakness that ASICs lack; 
the possibility exists that they can be surreptitiously reconfigured to open vulnerabilities 
in the system, though admittedly this is a much more involved procedure than an attack 
on a software implementation. 
1.5 FPGA Implementation 
After weighing the tradeoffs, an FPGA implementation was chosen.  The 
implementation needs to provide a computational base for high mobility, high 
performance electronic devices for use with the Need2Know system.  Hardware is 
necessary to realize the goal of providing secure access to information anywhere, 
anytime, and the FPGA technology provides a balance of high performance and 
flexibility necessary for prototyping.  Choosing an FPGA implementation also gives a 
clear migration path to an ASIC implementation, should the potential benefits of that 
technology be desired in the future.   
This document describes in full the FPGA implementation of the Need2Know 
KPM.  Organization is as follows: Chapter 2 explores the previous work on cryptographic 
coprocessors.  Chapter 3 gives in-depth coverage of the KPM algorithm and FPGA 
design steps.  Chapter 4 describes the logic design of the implementation.  Chapter 5 
discusses the implementation results.  Chapter 6 concludes this work and outlines 
possible directions for future work. 
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2 Background Study 
The need for cryptographic coprocessors is widely addressed in literature, both by 
academic researchers and by commercial designers.  As per its name, a coprocessor 
works in conjunction with some other microprocessor or microcontroller to produce a 
desired result.  Thus, the major design consideration for a coprocessor is how much of the 
processing to offload from the host processor.  In making this choice, there is a tradeoff 
between flexibility and performance.  The explored design strategies for cryptographic 
coprocessors are, in decreasing order of flexibility: 
• Programmable coprocessors, 
• Reconfigurable coprocessors,  
• loosely-integrated coprocessors, and  
• tightly-integrated coprocessors. 
2.1 Programmable Cryptographic Coprocessors 
Programmable cryptographic coprocessors offer the highest level of flexibility.  
Like any programmable processor, they implement some basic set of operations and 
provide these as sequentially-linked building blocks for complex algorithms.  A 
coprocessor’s design differs from that of a general purpose processor because it is 
assumed that only certain types of algorithms will be run.  This being the case, the 
instruction set architecture (ISA), data path logic, and control logic can be optimized for a 
limited selection of workloads.  To differentiate specialized programmable processors 
from general purpose processors, they are sometimes called domain-specific processors 
(Hodjat and Verbauwhede, 2004). 
2.1.1 Generalized Functional Units 
One technique used is that of generalized functional units.  In this case, the 
processor’s functional units do not single out any particular algorithm.  Rather, they 
perform operations applicable to a class of algorithms.  A selection of algorithms, e.g. a 
number of symmetric encryption algorithms, is first analyzed to determine the most 
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common operations.  These operations are then given the highest value through the 
design, but the functional units must still maintain enough functionality to be able to 
compute general purpose results, consuming some processing overhead.  Obviously, such 
a processor will perform much better on those algorithms that were considered by its 
designers, so it is important to note what considerations went into the design. 
 CryptoManiac is an architecture that makes use of generalized functional units 
(Wu, Weaver, and Austin, 2001).  The design is a 4-wide 32-bit Very Long Instruction 
Word (VLIW) architecture with a 4-stage pipeline, as shown in Figure 1.  Each word 
contains up to four independent instructions that can be computed in parallel.  There is no 
cache, and a simple branch target buffer (BTB) is used in the branch predictor.   
The functional units are optimized for symmetric key encryption algorithms.  In 
particular, the following algorithms were analyzed during the design stages: Blowfish, 
3DES, IDEA, Mars, RC4, RC6, Rijndael, and Twofish.  The resulting analysis showed 
commonalities among the algorithms, and the design was optimized to reflect these.  As 
shown in Figure 2, the units make use of a multiplier, a substitution box (SBOX), an 
adder, a rotator, and two logical units. 
The CryptoManiac processor supports a number of concurrent encryption sessions 
with separate keys and data.  Each VLIW processor is called a processing element, and a 
number of these processing units are used within CryptoManiac.  Input requests are 
loaded into a shared input queue and processed by a scheduler.  The scheduler directs 
each instruction to a processing unit, which loads its session info from a key store.  
Finally, results are deposited in a shared output queue. 
Another coprocessor based on generalized functional units is Cryptonite (Butchy, 
2002).  The stated mindset of the processor’s designer was to “not be a collection of 
specialized hardware.  Instead, it should be based on ideally primitive and reusable 
hardware functions.” Just as with the CryptoManiac, a number of symmetric encryption 
algorithms were analyzed (DES, AES, SHA, MD5, IDEA, and RC6) and the common 
operations were determined.   
The Cryptonite architecture, while being VLIW, differs significantly from that of 
CryptoManiac.  Cryptonite uses a 3-stage pipeline with fetch, decode, and ex/writeback.   
13 
 
Figure 1: The CrypoManiac processing architecture uses generalized functional units. 
 
 
Figure 2: The CryptoManiac functional unit is optimized for cryptographic applications. 
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It makes a strict distinction between data path and control, maintaining the SBOX data 
outside the functional units, unlike the CryptoManiac design.  Also, while the Cryptonite 
architecture supports two execution paths, it makes use of two separate memories to feed 
the two separate ALUs.  The design uses 64-bit registers, and the execution cycle is 
strictly single-cycle, unlike CryptoManiac’s pipelined multipliers. 
The generalized approach has also been applied to asymmetric algorithms.  
Researchers at Sun have created a VLIW public key coprocessor for RSA and ECC 
(Eberle, et al., 2004).  This processor makes use of optimized 64-bit multipliers to 
accelerate the multiple precision operations common in asymmetric cryptography.  Also 
of note, each instruction word is split into two regions – one for a control operation and 
its operands and one for a data operation and operands. 
2.1.2 Integrated Specialized Functional Units 
Another approach to accelerating cryptographic operations is to start with a 
general purpose processor and add custom instructions to the ISA (Ravi, et al., 2002).  
This is accomplished by integrating specialized functional units into the existing pipeline.  
When custom instructions travel down the processor pipeline, the specialized functional 
units take the place of the general purpose functional unit to execute them.  Since the 
fetch, decode, and pipeline logic is shared between the general purpose and specialized 
functional units, this scheme efficiently reuses hardware resources.  An architecture with 
custom DSP, security, and networking functional units is shown in Figure 3. 
The design was based on the Tensilica Xtensa T1040, a configurable 32-bit RISC 
processor.  First, the authors built a set of software libraries to implement the symmetric 
algorithms DES, 3DES, and AES as well as the asymmetric algorithms RSA and El-
Gamal.  Care was given to specify the libraries in a hierarchical fashion with high-level 
algorithms composed of low-level functions.  Then, by profiling the libraries, it was 
possible to determine which functions would benefit most from hardware acceleration.  
The hardware design space was iteratively explored as follows: the functions of interest 
were hand-optimized as hardware implementations, the processor was profiled, and  
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Figure 3: Various specialized functional units can be integrated into the processing. 
 
overall area and delay were inspected.  These steps were repeated, resulting in a final 
design that met the performance goals. 
2.1.3 External Specialized Functional Units 
For coarse-grained hardware acceleration, it is necessary to move the specialized 
functional units outside the main CPU’s pipeline.  This scheme uses loosely-coupled 
independent coprocessors that connect to the main CPU over a dedicated interface.  Since 
the coprocessors are outside the main pipeline, they can be larger and can perform more 
complex operations.  The downside is that this organization incurs some overhead for the 
interface and data buffering.  A high-level view of this type is shown in Figure 4, in 
which a main CPU has been linked to DSP, security, and networking coprocessors. 
A programmable AES coprocessor was designed with this organization in mind, 
as shown in Figure 5 (Hodjat and Verbauwhede, 2004).  Unlike the previously discussed 
programmable architectures, this one makes use of coarse instructions that are specific to 
a single algorithm.  Instructions from the CPU are received over a memory mapped 
interface, giving the CPU direct access to the coprocessor’s two 8-bit instruction and 
configuration registers and two 32-bit input and output registers.  Two categories of  
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Figure 4: Specialized functional units are attached external to the main CPU. 
 
 
Figure 5: An external specialized functional unit contains its own input, output, and control logic. 
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instructions are used: single and continuous.  While single operations are standard, 
continuous instructions facilitate operations on streams of data. 
The coprocessor internals are modular, comprised of an input module, output 
module, encryption module, and top controller.  Each module incorporates a state 
machine, and the machines are linked in a hierarchical fashion.  The design uses a three-
stage block pipeline, reading one block of data into the input stage, processing one block 
in the encryption stage, and outputting one block via the output stage.  To match the 
pipeline cycle count to the slowest stage, each stage of the pipeline takes 11 clock cycles 
to complete. 
2.2 Reconfigurable Cryptographic Coprocessors 
In addition to flexibility through programmability, a hardware coprocessor can 
achieve flexibility through reconfiguration.  In general, these solutions maintain a store of 
encryption algorithms and can dynamically load any of the supported algorithms into the 
device in order to complete a request.  The controlling CPU is responsible for selecting 
the desired algorithm.   
Reconfiguration offers a couple of distinct advantages over a fixed design.  First, 
a number of modern security standards, such as the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and 
Internet Protocol Secure (IPSec), define frameworks in which to use various symmetric 
or asymmetric algorithms.  Using reconfiguration, the required algorithm can be 
dynamically paged into the coprocessor, and then the controlling CPU can tie various 
algorithms together into some high-level standard.  This results in an area savings since 
the peak number of gates required is the number of gates required by the single largest 
algorithm.  Second, since the configuration memory can be reprogrammed, the hardware 
can be field-upgradeable.  This is a useful feature when algorithms need to be updated or 
replaced to handle changing standards or to combat cryptographic attacks. 
Since reconfigurable coprocessors generally support only one encryption 
algorithm at a time, they cannot take advantage of hardware’s potential for parallelism.  
Also, since they make use of FPGAs rather than fixed gates, they generally have higher 
power consumption, lower throughput, and higher per-unit cost. 
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2.2.1 Whole-FPGA Reconfiguration  
One approach to reconfiguration is to reconfigure the entire FPGA when a new 
encryption algorithm is required.  One such architecture, an Algorithm-Agile 
Cryptographic Coprocessor, is shown in Figure 6 (Paar, Chetwynd, Connor, Deng, 
Marchant, 1999).  In order to interact with the host PC, a number of external blocks are 
used, including a system controller and an algorithm library processor.  The algorithm 
library processor is responsible for paging entire FPGA bit-streams into the FPGA.   
This architecture focused on implementing the symmetric encryption AES 
candidates.  While the input, output, and control blocks are the same for any bit-stream, 
there is a custom algorithm core.  The architecture makes use of a standard interface to 
each of the custom cryptographic cores.  The number of supported algorithms is limited 
only by the algorithm library, and this architecture’s library has a seven-algorithm 
capacity.  A similar reconfigurable architecture with minor updates was explored in 
(Mingyu, Jinahua, Guangwei, 2003).   
Another architecture, the Adaptive Cryptographic Engine (ACE) shown in Figure 
7, aggressively addresses the storage limitations of the algorithm library (Dandalis and 
Prasanna, 2000).  The configuration bit-streams are organized in memory as 
parameterized configuration skeletons and various parameter sets.  The skeletons and 
parameters are combined at run time to generate the bit-stream for device configuration.  
Furthermore, a variant of LZ compression suitable for hardware is used to realize 
compression ratios of 65%-95%. 
2.2.2 Partial Reconfiguration 
The CryptoBooster architecture shown in Figure 8 makes use of dynamic partial 
reconfiguration, reconfiguring only a portion of the configurable gates when a new 
algorithm is required (Mosanya, 1999).  This has two potential advantages over whole-
FPGA reconfiguration: algorithm-switching can be faster and configuration storage 
requirements are lower.   
Because part of the processor fabric can be replaced on demand, the architecture 
must be highly modular.  This modularity is enforced through the use of a standard point- 
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Figure 6: A processor, controller, and coprocessor comprise the algorithm-agile cryptographic 
coprocessor. 
 
  
 
Figure 7: The adaptive cryptographic engine uses dynamic bit-stream synthesis. 
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Figure 8: CryptoBooster’s architecture allows dynamic reconfiguration of the encryption algorithm. 
 
to-point interface between the encryption algorithm module, or CypherCore, and the 
session control module.  The standard communication signals support a query/response 
system, allowing the “intelligent” algorithm module to reports its capabilities to the 
controller.  Queries and responses are packets of control or data information. 
The architecture also supports multiple encryption sessions, requiring a session 
adapter module and access to session memory.  The session adapter is specific to the 
encryption algorithm, so it, too, is dynamically reconfigured when a new encryption 
algorithm is loaded.  A query/response point-to-point link also exists between the session 
control module and the session adapter.   
2.3 Loosely-Integrated Cryptographic Coprocessor Systems 
Fixed cryptographic coprocessors can be divided based on the level of integration 
of their algorithms.  In loosely-integrated systems, a number of algorithms are supported, 
but the host CPU is responsible for tying their results together for use in a high-level 
protocol.  Various approaches have made use of FPGA or fixed-gate technologies.  Both 
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provide higher performance compared to the reconfigurable cryptographic coprocessors 
since they remove the latency of reconfiguration.  However, this benefit comes at the 
expense of increased area needed to support multiple algorithms.   
2.3.1 Partial Protocol Support 
Modern communications protocols, such as IPSec and TLS, define support for 
numerous cryptographic algorithms, but some coprocessor architectures offer only partial 
protocol support.  This approach lessens the complexity of the design and reduces chip 
area, but it is most useful if only a part of the protocol will be needed or if only the most 
common case needs to be sped up.  With the reduced area requirements, these designs 
can be implemented in an FPGA. 
An architecture that supports AES and SHA/HMAC for the IPSec protocol is 
shown in Figure 9 (McLoone and MCanny, 2002).  The two cores can operate in parallel, 
providing an increase in the encryption performance.  As shown in the figure, the 
architecture contains a minimum of control, and the host CPU is responsible for 
 
 
Figure 9: This loosely-integrated architecture offers AES (Rijndael) and HMAC-SHA-1 functionality with 
a minimum of control logic. 
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providing all the setup and control signals and incorporating the results into some high-
level protocol.  This design was tested in a Xilinx Virtex XCV1000E FPGA. 
Another architecture that has partial protocol support is outlined in Crowe, Daily, 
Kerins, and Marnane, 2004.  This architecture supports AES, SHA-512, and RSA DSA, 
and it is designed to accelerate IPSec and TLS communications.  Unlike the previous 
architecture, this design offers public key algorithm acceleration along with symmetric 
key operations.  This design, as with the previous, allows the AES encryption block to 
run in parallel with the other blocks. 
In this architecture, the designers attempted to optimize whole-chip performance 
rather than the performance of a single algorithm.  One technique they used was to insert 
a FIFO buffer between the shared memory interface and the algorithm blocks (both on 
the input and output sides).  This allows the symmetric encryption and the SHA/DSA 
operations to run in parallel from the same input source.  The architecture also makes use 
of multiple clock domains, allowing the RAM and logic to run at different rates.  This 
design was implemented and tested on a Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E FPGA. 
2.3.2 Full Protocol Support 
Loosely-integrated architectures with full protocol support implement all of the 
functions needed by the high-level protocol.  In essence, they connect a number of 
algorithm-specific cores on a system bus and provide the various core functions to the 
host CPU.  These architectures have high area requirements to support the various 
algorithms, and the bus is a necessity to handle the added complexity of so many cores.  
In the interest of increasing throughput, they might incorporate supporting algorithms 
such as random number generators, and in the interest of increasing security, they might 
implement attack resistance measures. 
The Discretix CryptoCell, shown in Figure 10, provides full protocol support 
(Discretix, 2005).  A number of algorithm-specific cores are implemented on a bus.  The 
symmetric key operations of AES, DES, and 3DES are supported, the hash operations of 
SHA1, MD5, and HMAC are supported, and the public key operations of RSA, DSA, 
ECC, and DH are supported.  In order to implement the IPSec protocol, or any other  
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Figure 10: The Discretix CryptoCell is a loosely-integrated coprocessor with full protocol support. 
 
high-level protocol, the host CPU ties together the results of the various cores.  
Additionally, a random number generator is included, as are unspecified attack resistance 
components. 
IBM offers a similar full protocol coprocessor, the UltraCypher Cryptographic 
Engine (IBM, 1998).  The UltraCypher provides specialized cores for DES, 3DES, MAC, 
3MAC, RSA, modular exponentiation, modular arithmetic, SHA1, and random number 
generation.  Its interface is via the ISA bus, and the host CPU has read/write access to 
various control, setup, and status registers.  Data buffering is via FIFO buffers. 
2.4 Tightly-Integrated Cryptographic Coprocessors 
Tightly-integrated coprocessors offer the hardware acceleration.  Instead of 
relying on the host-CPU to direct the links among various cryptographic operations, link 
some or all of these operations using internal control.  The input to these processors can 
be entire communication packets, rather than raw data, and the processor can be 
responsible for parsing the header and trailer, verifying and decoding the payload, and 
creating the output packet.  Rather than necessarily being more restrictive, these 
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coprocessors can offer a superset of the loosely-integrated functionality.  Some or all of 
the packet processing functionality can be revealed to the host CPU, resulting in the same 
level of access to low-level cryptographic functions.   
 The SafeNet SafeXcel-1840 coprocessor, shown in Figure 11, uses the tightly-
integrated approach (SafeNet, 2005).  Its overall architecture links a public key 
accelerator with a number of packet processing engines via a bus.  Each packet 
processing engine incorporates a symmetric encryption algorithm and a hashing 
algorithm, and along with those are input/output buffers, header and trailer parsing logic, 
context memory, and control logic.   
 The SafeNet coprocessor supports AES, DES, 3DES, and ARC4 symmetric 
encryption algorithms, MD5 and SHA1 hashing algorithms, and DH, RSA, and DSA 
public key algorithms.  A random number generator is also included.  For interfacing, 
PCI, PCI-express, or a shared memory interface are supported.  Since the packet engines 
and public key accelerators are separate entities, they can run in parallel for a 
performance boost.  Performance is also increased because a dedicated hardware 
controller chooses which engine receives which input packet, communication with the 
host CPU is packet-based, and burst packet transfers are possible.   
 Another tightly-integrated coprocessor is the Hifn HIPP 7855 (Hifn, 2005).  
Feature-wise, this coprocessor is similar to the SafeNet design, but the architectural 
details are not made available to the public.    
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Figure 11: The SafeNet SafeXcel-1840 is a tightly-integrated coprocessor with packet processing. 
 
  
26 
3 General 
In the N2K, the KPM specifies how various cryptographic standards are linked to 
provide cryptographic Role Based Access Control (RBAC).  The following sections are 
organized as follows.  First, the basic N2K organization is presented.  Next, the various 
steps of the KPM, as well as their associated cryptographic standards, are elaborated in 
the order that they are conducted.  Finally, the FPGA design flow is presented.   
3.1 N2K Organization 
N2K has a carefully defined centralized management scheme that enforces 
separation of duty.  That is, a number of management roles are defined, and no one role 
has the power to compromise the integrity of information protected by N2K.  The details 
of N2K administrative roles, while important, have little to do with the KPM and are not 
discussed here (InfoAssure N2K, 2004).  Additional administrative steps, while 
mentioned, are not discussed in detail. 
Administrators oversee cryptographic domains, many of which might be 
represented within a single organization.  A domain defines the elliptic curve math to be 
used by specifying the curve, base polynomial, and base point.  The NIST-approved K-
571 and B-571 curves are the only approved curves, but the base polynomial and base 
point are generated by the administrators. 
Access control in N2K is based upon possession of label key pairs, or labels.  
Labels are pre-computed elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key pairs coupled with a 
globally-unique identifier, or GUID.  For ECDH, the public key is a point on an elliptic 
curve, and the private key is a large integer.  When data is encrypted, a number of labels 
are assigned to set the access permissions.  Possession of the required public keys gives a 
user write access, while possession of the required private keys gives a user read/write 
access.  Except for the responsibility of maintaining private key secrecy, the security of 
the system is enforced via cryptographic means.  
It is the responsibility of the N2K administrators to generate and distribute the 
labels.  Also, at any time, the administrators can update labels, enabling access to be 
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temporally restricted.  Another duty of the administration is to select appropriate 
cryptographic algorithms used in the scheme.  This choice is made according to the 
organization’s needs, and for the rest of the discussion it is assumed that a subset of the 
available options has been selected. 
3.2 KPM Encryption 
The KPM encryption process is the sequence of steps necessary to create an N2K 
packet.  A user must select the desired access permissions and create the initial content, 
and then these inputs are run through the KPM algorithm to produce the encrypted 
output.  The process of data encryption is as follows: 
1) The user chooses labels (named key pairs) that determine permissions of the 
encrypted data. 
2) A valid symmetric key (K) and initialization vector (IV) are generated randomly. 
3) An ephemeral private key (de) for each domain is generated. 
4) A public key (Qe) is calculated for each ephemeral private key. 
5) For each label set, a key encryption key (KEK) is derived. 
6) For each label set, K is wrapped with a KEK to generate the wrapped key (wK). 
7) The data (P) is signed with the user’s private key (ds) to generate the inner 
signature (S). 
8) P is encrypted with K and IV to generate the encrypted data (C). 
9) The metadata and encrypted data are packaged.   
10) The package is signed with the user's private key (ds) to generate the outer 
signature (SH).  This binds the encrypted message and the metadata and finalizes 
the N2K packet. 
A top-level view of the KPM encryption process is shown in Figure 12, and the 
various steps are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 12: Label sets, random values, and data are used to generate encrypted data and header information 
(InfoAssure N2K, 2004). 
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3.3 KPM Decryption 
The KPM decryption process is the reverse of the encryption process.  When an 
authorized user receives the packet, he or she will be able decrypt the packet and 
regenerate the original input content.  The KPM data decryption steps are as follows: 
1) The encrypting user’s public key (Qs) is used to verify the outer signature (SH). 
2) A shared values (SV) is calculated for the label for which the recipient holds 
private keys. 
3) From the set of SV, KEK is derived. 
4) KEK is used to unwrap wK  and recover K. 
5) K and IV are used to decrypt the data P. 
6) Using the encrypting user’s public key (Qs), the inner signature (S) is verified 
against the decrypted text. 
A top-level view of the KPM decryption process is shown in Figure 13, and the various 
steps are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
3.4 KPM Keying Material 
Various keys are used throughout the N2K process.  Some of this keying material is 
generated by administrative processes outside the scope of the KPM, such as the label 
keys.  The KPM itself, however, is responsible for generating data encryption keys, 
initialization vectors, and ephemeral key pairs.  Random values are needed for all of these 
parameters, and secure random number generation is essential for the security of the 
scheme.  Pseudo-random number generation standards are employed, but they must be 
seeded with a high-quality source of entropy.   
3.4.1 Random Values 
A NIST-approved pseudo-random number generator from ANS X9.63, Annex 
A.4.1, is used for the KPM (Accredited Standards Committee ANS X9.63, 2002).  This 
generator is seeded with a non-deterministic random number and then relies on 
successive applications of the cryptographic hash algorithm SHA-1 to generate its values.  
The pseudo-random number generation function is defined as 
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Figure 13: A label set, the header, and the encrypted data are decrypted to recover the original data 
(InfoAssure N2K, 2004). 
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png(l, n, x, y) 
where the output is l random values, each less than n.  In general, n is 2b - 1, where b is 
the number of bits needed for the random values.  The x and y values are both b-bit real 
random values used for seeding the generator. 
3.4.2 Ephemeral Key Pairs 
During encryption, ephemeral key pairs are generated for each domain spanned 
by the relevant label set.  The ephemeral private key, de, is generated with the 
pseudorandom number generator such that 
de = png(1, r, XKEY, XSEED) 
where r is the order of the elliptic curve and the XKEY and XEED values are generated 
randomly.  The ephemeral public key, Qe, is then derived from the ephemeral public key 
via 
Qe = deG 
where G is the domain base point.  Note that since both Qe and G are points, they are 
represented with bold type. 
3.5 KPM Labels and Label Combining Logic 
To assign access permissions to data, a content creator must select some number 
of labels.  These labels can be combined using the logical “AND” and “OR” operators to 
narrow or broaden permissions, respectively.   
3.5.1 Disjunctive and Conjunctive Label Sets 
Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) is the standard form for entering label sets at the 
user or application level.  In this form, labels are combined with “OR” operators to form 
a label set, and multiple label sets can be combined with “AND” operators.  An example 
is: 
L1 AND (L2,1 OR L2,2 OR …) AND (L3,1 OR L3,2 OR …) AND … 
where a label Li,j represents the jth label of the ith disjunctive label set.   
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 Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) is the label set form that is needed at the 
algorithm level, so the DNF form must be converted, by means of standard Boolean 
algebra.  The example above can be rewritten as: 
(L1 AND L2,1 AND L3,1 AND …) OR (L1 AND L2,2 AND L3,2 AND …) OR … 
In this CNF expression, each parenthetical statement is a Conjunctive Label Set (CLS).  
In the KPM, each CLS is used in the generation of a wrapping key.  Each label in a CLS 
is used to calculate a shared value, and the shared values become the input to a key 
derivation function that outputs a CLS-specific wrapping key. 
3.5.2 Special Labels 
Special labels called sensitivity labels are used to specify how data is handled.  
These labels denote the type and strength of the identification and authentication needed 
to log in, the minimum strength of cryptographic algorithms that can be used, whether a 
digital signature is required, and what integrity and size the digital signature should be.  
For an encryption operation, exactly one sensitivity label is used.  In the previous 
disjunctive and conjunctive example equations, the L1,1 term represents the sensitivity 
label. 
Another special label is the foreign label, which is a label from another domain.  
In the domestic domain, a corresponding shadow label is created.  Each domain has its 
own set of parameters, so each label has different domain parameters associated with it.  
Whenever the foreign label is used in an operation, the corresponding shadow label must 
also be used in order to allow key recovery within the domestic domain. 
3.6 KPM Key Wrapping 
The labels from the previous section are used to generate wrapping keys unique to 
each CLS.  Since labels consist of public/private key pairs, the public keys can be used to 
encrypt data in such a way that only members with the corresponding private keys have 
access to the data.  This is done by generating a number of CLS-specific wrapping keys 
to protect one symmetric encryption key. 
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3.6.1 Shared Values 
Shared values, SVj, are generated for each label in the CLS.  For encryption, the 
shared values are calculated by multiplying the private ephemeral key (de) with the 
label’s public key (Qj) and taking the x-value of the resulting point.  The process is 
Zj = deQj 
SVj = xZj 
where j is the index of the jth label.  After encryption, these shared values are discarded, 
and the shared values for one CLS need to be generated again during the decryption.  
This entails multiplying the public ephemeral key (Qe) and the private label key (dj), as 
follows: 
Zj = Qedj 
SVj = xZj 
3.6.2 Key Encryption Key 
The key encryption key is derived by means of the key derivation function of 
ANSI X9.63, Section 5.6.3 (Accredited Standards Committee ANS X9.63, 2002): 
KEK = kdf(Z, SharedInfo) 
Z is a concatenation of the shared values: 
Z = xZ1||xZ2||…||xZd 
where d, is the number of labels in the CLS.  The SharedInfo parameter is 
SharedInfo = L1||L2||…||Ld 
where Lj refers to the GUID of the jth label.  The key derivation function makes use of the 
SHA-512 hash function (National Institute of Standards and Technology FIPS Pub 180-2, 
2002).  Note that the size of the key encryption key is 256 bits. 
3.6.3 Key Wrapping 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key wrap function is used to wrap the 
data encryption key (National Institute of Standards AES Key Wrap, 2002).  For 
encryption, the process is 
wKi = WKEKi(K) 
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where K is the data encryption key, WKEKi is the key wrap function, KEKi is the key 
encryption key from the ith CLS, and wKi is the wrapped key.  Similarly, for unwrapping, 
the process is 
K = UKEKi(wKi) 
where UKEKi is the unwrap function. 
3.7 KPM Symmetric Encryption 
The symmetric encryption used in the KPM is the 256-bit key AES algorithm in 
cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode (National Institute of Standards AES, 2001).  For 
encryption, the process is 
Ci = EK(Pi XOR Ci-1), C0 = IV 
where Pi is the ith block (of 128 bits), EK is encryption operation with key K, IV is the 
initialization vector, and Ci is the ith encrypted block.  For decryption, the process is 
Pi = DK(Ci) XOR Ci-1, C0 = IV 
where DK is the decryption operation with key K. 
3.8 N2K Packet Header 
The N2K packet header accompanies the encrypted data.  Its purpose is to package 
the metadata needed to manage packets successfully, such as the author’s user ID, 
wrapped keys, digital signatures, and the ephemeral public key.  The packet also carries 
any additional information needed to recreate the original data.  The packet contents can 
be seen in Table 1. In the table, c is the total number of CLSs, d is the total number of 
disjunctive label sets, g is the total number of domains spanned by the chosen labels and 
u is the number of authoring users. 
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Table 1: The N2K packet header contains metadata needed to successfully decrypt the message 
(InfoAssure N2K, 2004). 
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4 Implementation 
This implementation makes use of the standard simulation-based FPGA design 
flow, shown in Figure 14.  First, the design requirements are enumerated.  Next, an 
architectural specification is developed with register transfer logic (RTL); its behavior is 
specified using a hardware description language such as VHDL.  Then, functional 
simulations are performed until the desired level of correctness is reached.  Following 
correct behavioral simulation, the flow is passed through a synthesis tool to translate the 
description into generic logic primitives.  Simulations are performed to check the design 
after synthesis.  The next step is placing and routing of the design logic, which is 
accomplished by vendor-specific tools.  A third simulation step can be used to verify the 
design with all of its logic and routing delays.  Finally, the implementation is 
programmed into the FPGA. 
4.1 KPM Architecture 
The KPM architecture is that of a tightly-integrated cryptographic coprocessor; it 
is external to a host CPU, and it performs all of the operations needed to implement the 
KPM algorithm.  The host CPU gives high-level commands to the coprocessor and 
supplies the necessary N2K packet data.  The CPU and coprocessor are linked by a bus 
with 32 or 64-bit data width, and communication is via shared dual-port RAM.  This 
arrangement is shown in Figure 15. 
The coprocessor’s main functional block is the controller, which handles the high-
level steps of the KPM algorithm.  The controller directs the shared memory operations 
and also controls the various cryptographic modules, which implement specific 
cryptographic algorithms.  To optimize the area of the design, each module is only used 
once within the design; the controller arbitrates access to the cryptographic modules since 
more than one KPM step might require the same module.  This organization is shown in 
Figure 16. 
 Rather than using a bus, direct links are used between the controller and the 
cryptographic modules.  A bus would add latency since it would require large  
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Figure 14: Simulation-based FPGA involves multiple simulation cycles before the final implementation. 
 
 
Figure 15: The KPM architecture is a tightly-integrated coprocessor external to the CPU. 
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Figure 16: The KPM architecture is a controller directly linked to many cryptographic modules. 
 
cryptographic words to be split into bus-width vectors and sent over multiple clock 
cycles.  While this might be less of a problem if the cryptographic modules were all 
pipelined, many of them are not, in the interest of saving area.  Using direct links, which 
offer decreased latency, has the downside of increasing routing complexity. 
4.1.1 Memory Map 
The shared dual-port is divided into four regions based on function, as depicted in 
Figure 17.  The first and second regions are for control to the KPM and to the host CPU, 
respectively.  The third region holds the N2K metadata and CPU-generated data, such as 
the random seeds, elliptic curve parameters, and signing keys, and label sets.  The fourth 
region holds the message cache.   
Region 1 bits set the configuration of the current operation, and a single 64-bit 
word is used for this purpose.  Using this word, the CPU selects whether the coprocessor 
will proceed with encryption, decryption, or built-in self test (BIST).  It also sets other 
information not included in the N2K header, such as the status of the message cache and  
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Figure 17: The memory map defines four regions: two for control, one for metadata, and one for the 
message cache. 
 
whether to use the default curve parameters (a testing feature).  The significance of each 
bit in region one is given in Table 2.   
 Region 2 bits report the coprocessor status to the host CPU, and a single 64-bit 
word is reserved for this region.  The 0-byte is used for mid-operation status, namely 
whether the cache has been replenished with encrypted data and is ready to be read by the 
host CPU.  The 1-byte is used for end-of-operation status that reports bad metadata keys 
or signatures.  The remaining used bits are used to report BIST status and to specify the 
exact cause of failure.  The used bits and their descriptions are shown in Table 3.   
Region 3 contains the N2K metadata needed for the desired operation, as listed in 
Figure 17.  It also contains large vectors of data generated by the CPU, such as true-
random seed values.  In the implementation, each memory location is defined relatively 
so that the physical memory locations are assigned at compile time.  This facilitates 
future updates to the memory map, releasing the designer from the need to manually 
recalculate how each metadata field should fit into the 64-bit memory slots. 
The fourth region, or memory cache, is used to hold subsets of the message data.  
The host CPU initially writes input data to the cache, and the coprocessor overwrites this 
input with the processed output.  The existence of a memory buffer such as this cache  
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Table 2: Region 1 contains the Host CPU to KPM control bits. 
Bit Name Description 
0 ENC_DEC_BIT 1=encrypt, 0=decrypt 
1 BIST_BIT 1=run BIST, 0 = normal 
2 LAST_CACHE_BIT 1=last cache fill/partial, 0=more cache fills ahead 
3 B571_BIT 1=B571 curve, 0=K571 curve 
4 DEFAULT_G_BIT 1=use default curve base point, 0=specify point 
5-7 Unused  
8-15 CACHE_SZ Number-1 of 128-bit message blocks in cache 
16-23 C Number of CLS blocks in cache 
24-63 Unused  
 
Table 3: Region 2 contains the KPM to Host CPU control bits. 
Bit Name Description 
0 CACHE_FULL_BIT 1=done with cache, 0=ready or processing 
2-7 Unused 0-byte reserved for mid-operation status 
8 DONE_BIT 1=done with everything, 0=processing caches 
9 Qe_INVALID_BIT 1=invalid ephemeral public key (dec) 
10 WK_INVALID_BIT 1=invalid wrapped key (dec) 
11 OS_INVALID_BIT 1=invalid outer signature (dec) 
12-15 Unused 1-byte reserved for end-of-operation status 
16 BIST_ENC_CTRL_FAIL_BIT 1=failed enc ctrl BIST 
17 BIST_DEC_CTRL_FAIL_BIT 1=failed dec ctrl BIST 
18 BIST_ENC_FAIL_BIT 1=failed enc encrypt BIST 
19 BIST_DEC_FAIL_BIT 1=failed dec decrypt BIST 
20 BIST_WK_FAIL_BIT 1=failed key wrap generation BIST 
21 BIST_OS_FAIL_BIT 1=failed outer signature generation BIST 
22-63 Unused  
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allows burst transfers that can increase performance; the host CPU can fill the cache and 
then perform some other tasks while waiting for the coprocessor to continue.  Also, since 
the shared memory is of limited size, it is possible that multiple transfers of data will be 
required in order to fully process a single encryption request.  It is assumed that the 
memory is large enough to contain all of the metadata but that it can only accommodate a 
fraction of the message; that fraction is loaded into the message cache.  The host CPU 
and the coprocessor may need to read and update their control signals several times 
before the full message is processed. 
4.1.2 Main Controller 
The main controller implements a state machine to oversee all operations in the 
coprocessor.  The controller sits in ready state until receiving a start signal.  It then 
fetches the control word from memory, decodes the configuration bits to determine the 
operation, and proceeds with the desired operation.  For encryption and decryption, sub-
state machines are used.  For the built-in self test, load and check states are bound to both 
the encryption and decryption states.  Upon completion of the operations, the controller 
returns to the ready state.  The main state machine is depicted in Figure 18. 
4.1.3 Encryption 
The encryption state machine follows the KPM algorithm through all the states 
necessary for encryption.  From the initial ready state, the curve parameters are loaded 
and the pseudo-random key (K), initialization vector (IV), and ephemeral private key (de) 
are generated.  Then, the ephemeral public key (Qe) is calculated.  Loops are used to find 
the shared values (SV) from the CLSs and CLS GUIDs, to generate the key encryption 
keys (kek), and to generated the wrapped keys (wK).  Following these operations, the 
encrypted data and hash are generated.  Finally, the inner and outer signatures are 
computed.  The entire cycle is depicted in Figure 19.   
Exploiting parallelism at the KPM level is in some cases possible, when both (a) 
successive states do not require the same module and (b) the function inputs have been 
previously generated.  Steps 8-10 of the KPM algorithm meet this requirement.  Since  
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Figure 18: The main state machine oversees KPM operations. 
 
 
Figure 19: The encryption state machine follows the KPM algorithm. 
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these steps encrypt and sign the message which can theoretically range from 0 to 2128 bits, 
they stand to be a major bottleneck in the KPM.  Additionally, they encompass the data 
passing with the host CPU, which can suffer from high latency.  Thus, these relatively 
slow operations are parallelized as follows: message blocks are read from shared dual-
port RAM, the data is encrypted (using AES-256), the N2K package is constructed in 
RAM, the hash value is generated (using SHA-512), and requests for more data are sent 
to the host CPU.  The cycle graph is shown in Figure 20.  The scheme needs to be 
unusually flexible since the AES-256 module is multi-cycle, the RAM is pipelined, and 
the SHA-512 module is both pipelined and sometimes multi-cycle. 
 The effect of this parallelism can be examined using Amdahl’s Law: 
enhanced
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which sets a bound on the performance gain (Hennessy and Patterson, 2003).  The 
Fractionenhanced term is the portion of the cycles used by SHA-512, and Speedupenhanced is 
the speedup of SHA-512 due to parallel computations.  Using a 17-cycle encryption 
module and 80-cycle SHA-512 module, the SHA-512 is responsible for 33% of the 
cycles and 25% of its cycles are in parallel. Thus, the speedup is a modest 1.09.  Further 
enhancement of this block would require additional modules or modules with lower-
latencies. 
When multiple recipient roles are specified, steps 4 and 5 also meet the 
parallelization requirements.  Making use of a two-stage pipeline, step 4 could begin 
generating a new KEK while step 5 wraps K with the previously generated KEK.  The 
implementation, however, does not take advantage of this.  While steps 8-10 are potential 
bottlenecks, steps 4 and 5 generally consist of relatively few hashes and encrypt 
operations, so no effort is made to pipeline them. 
4.1.4 Decryption 
The decryption state machine follows the KPM algorithm through all the states 
necessary for decryption.  From the initial ready state, the curve parameters are loaded 
and validated.  The shared value (SV) from the appropriate CLS and CLS GUIDs is  
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Figure 20: Parallelism is exploited during steps 8-10 of the KPM algorithm. 
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found, and one of the key encryption keys (kek) can be calculated.  Loops are needed to 
traverse the memory arrays of CLS and CLS GUIDs.  With the kek, a wrapped key (wK) 
can be unwrapped to reveal the data encryption key (K).  The message can then be 
decrypted, and a hash can be generated.  After the entire message has been passed 
through the message cache, the outer and inner signatures can be verified.  The entire 
cycle is depicted in Figure 21. 
Parallelization potential for the decrypt operation is very similar to that for 
encryption.  The SHA-512 and AES-256 modules can be run in parallel as the message is 
being processed.  The main difference between the encryption and decryption operations 
is the order of operations – in the decrypt case, the signature is generated with the input to 
the AES-256 module rather than with its output. 
4.1.5 Built-In Self Test (BIST) 
The BIST mode simulates both encrypt and decrypt requests from the host CPU.  
Initially, it loads test data into dual-port RAM.  Then it begins the encryption process.  
Upon completion, the results in RAM are compared to internally-stored “golden” outputs, 
and the discrepancies are noted.  Control signals, generated keys, encrypted results, and 
hash results are tested in this manner, and the state machine for these checks is shown in 
Figure 22.  The memory-loading process is then repeated to test decryption, and the 
decrypt BIST checks the control signals and decryption results.  The decrypt BIST can be 
simpler since a number of verification steps are built into the decryption steps 
themselves.  When the BIST completes, it returns the status of its various modules to the 
host CPU. 
BIST tests are based on standard test vectors for the individual cryptographic 
algorithms.  Currently, tests use four basic vectors along with keying materials from the 
AES Key Wrap specification.  The golden vectors are stored in parameterized arrays 
stored in look-up tables.  Increasing the number of test vectors is a matter of changing the 
array size and updating the array values, and if the test vectors are increased to a 
sufficiently large size then the synthesis tool will make use of on-FPGA RAM resources. 
  
46 
  
 
 
 
Figure 21: The decryption state machine follows the KPM decrypt algorithm. 
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Figure 22: For encryption, the BIST checks for wrapped key, encryption, and hash results. 
 
4.2 Cryptographic Modules 
While the main contribution of this work is the KPM controller, the controller is 
necessarily dependent upon the design of its slave modules.  To implement and test the 
controller, the modules had to be created and tested themselves.  While the modules are 
not the focus, their implementations are briefly discussed below, as their design affects 
the design and performance of the entire system. 
4.2.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-256) 
The AES-256 algorithm performs symmetric encryption operations for the KPM.  
The algorithm consists mainly of substitution, addition, and XOR operations, making it 
relatively efficient for hardware implementations.  There are a number of tradeoffs when 
choosing an implementation for AES-256, and the chosen algorithm aims for relatively 
low area usage with modest performance.  The implementation uses a non-pipelined, 
LUT-based loop architecture.  It uses 17 cycles for encryption or decryption, and there is 
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an additional penalty for the key scheduler whenever a new key is loaded for decryption.  
While the LUT-based approach uses slightly more logic than a RAM-based approach, it 
offers improved performance.  Performance is lessened by the choice of a non-pipelined 
and looped architecture, but this configuration offers significant area savings. 
4.2.2 AES Key Wrap (AESKW) 
The AES Key Wrap algorithm packages an encryption key by encrypting it with a 
data integrity check.  For key wrapping, a key wrapping key is supplied, and the input 
key is encrypted for secure storage and transmission.  Upon unwrap, the wrapped key can 
be recovered, and the algorithm verifies whether the correct result was generated.  The 
algorithm involves shifts and XOR operations and is built on top of AES-256.  Thus, the 
KPM controller passes control of the AES-256 module to the AESKW module when key 
wrapping/unwrapping needs to take place.    
4.2.3 Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) 
The DRBG implements the N2K png function by means of the SHA-1 algorithm.  
The SHA-1 algorithm is efficiently implemented in hardware since it consists of rotation, 
addition, and XOR operations.  The core of the algorithm takes a 512-bit input block 
made of 32-bit words and produces 160-bit output, taking 80 cycles to process one block.  
In a typical SHA-1 implementation, the hashing operation is wrapped with a padding 
operation, but wrapping is not required for the DRBG implementation. 
Random number generation begins with a true random seed passed from the host 
CPU.  The seed is used as the initial input to the SHA-1 hash function, and an initial 
block is processed by SHA-1.  The initial return value is stored for later use as well as 
being used to generate a new input to the hash function.  Then, the hashing process is 
repeated with the new input, and the new output is stored.  The process repeats until it has 
generated a sufficient number of pseudo-random bits. 
Though the output from the hash function is a multiple of 160-bits, KPM keying 
material needs to be either 571-bit (for elliptic curve keys) or 256-bit (for AES keys).  
For EC, the value must belong to a particular field, so the modulus of a 640-bit number 
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needs to be found.  The implementation thus makes use of a generic-divisor binary 
division algorithm.  For the symmetric key, the process is simpler, and the 256-bits can 
simply be extracted from the concatenated hash outputs. 
4.2.4 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) 
Generating a digital signature via DSA involves applying elliptic curve encryption 
to a message hash.  The SHA-512 module is used to hash the message contents.  Unlike 
with the AESKW module’s use of AES, the DSA module does not directly control the 
SHA-512 module.  Rather, hashing is carried out under the direction of the KPM 
controller, in order to keep the elliptic curve operations as independent modules.  The 
motivation for separating the elliptic curve modules is to keep them as black boxes during 
the testing of the KPM controller.  The elliptic curve math was not implemented at the 
time of the controller’s design, so the DSA implementation is merely a stub architecture 
for testing. 
4.2.5 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 
The ECDH module is designed to perform one of three functions.  First, it can 
validate a public key input point.  Second, it can generate a public key from a private key 
and base point.  Third, it can generate the shared value result from input public and 
private keys under the given curve parameters.  As with the DSA module, the ECDH 
module is not fully implemented because the elliptic curve math designs were not 
available at the time of the KPM controller implementation.  A stub module was designed 
with the necessary inputs and outputs to allow the ECDH module to base its calculations 
on the current session’s curve parameters. 
4.2.6 Key Derivation Function (KDF) 
The KDF module uses a hashing function to generate keying material for 
AESKW.  It operates under a similar principle as the DRBG: the input values are 
concatenated and hashed.  With the KDF, however, there are two distinct input arrays of 
non-pre-determined length: the shared values and the CLS GUIDs.  First, the shared 
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values are concatenated, then a count of the keys to be generated is added, and finally the 
GUIDs are appended. 
When the KDF module is in use, the KPM controller relinquishes complete 
control of the SHA-512 module.  The input concatenation is built dynamically and 
streamed to the SHA-512 module.  Once hashing is complete, a 512-bit hash is output.  
From this result, 256 bits are saved and used as the wrapping key. 
4.2.7 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-512) 
SHA-512 is the hash algorithm that is used for generating digital signatures.  As 
discussed previously, the SHA-512 algorithm is expected to be part of the bottleneck in 
the KPM implementation.  Unlike the SHA-1 implementation, the SHA-512 algorithm is 
pipelined to begin processing before the full input block has been passed.  Inputs are 
1024 bits wide and composed of 64-bit words, and the core processing takes 80 cycles.  
Post-processing can add another 80 or 160 cycles.   
Except for the larger input block and data words, the SHA-512 algorithm is very 
similar to SHA-1 with minor arithmetic differences.  Whereas the SHA-1 is encapsulated 
by the DRBG algorithm, the SHA-512 algorithm is manipulated directly by the KPM 
controller.  Because of this, the block wrapping function is also implemented.  The block 
wrapping functionality pads input blocks to the correct size and, if necessary, adds an 
empty block on the end of the input stream. 
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5 Results and Discussion 
The design was built incrementally, and each module was tested after it was 
specified.  Then, upon adding one module to the controller and updating the control logic, 
the integrated whole was verified before repeating the process for another module.  This 
iterative testing process was used to verify and debug the RTL design completely.  
Following the incremental verification, the design was synthesized into a netlist.  The 
synthesized results were then re-verified before being passed through placement and 
routing.  In the following sections, the results of these processes are presented. 
5.1 RTL Verification 
Two types of verification were used to test the KPM controller design.  The 
Mentor ModelSim tool was used for functional (and timing) simulation, and the Cadence 
FormalCheck tool was used for formal verification.  While functional verification verifies 
the basic functionality of the design, formal verification checks for the existence of hard-
to-locate deadlocks, control failures, and corner-case bugs.  Functional verification is 
standard practice for any logic design, and it was used on both the modules and the 
controller.  Formal verification is most applicable to control-oriented designs, making the 
controller a good candidate since it offers significant complexity in the steps related to 
parallel encryption, hash computations, memory accesses, and host CPU communication.   
5.1.1 Mentor ModelSim 
As part of the incremental testing, initial test benches were applied to verify the 
behavior of individual modules.  In general, a test bench was built to test each of the 
modules using standard test vectors.  The test benches made use of assertions, which 
allowed the correct functionality to be specified within the test bench.  Using this 
approach, it was possible to run iterative tests from the console, letting the test bench 
automatically verify outputs.  An example of successful output for the console-based 
testing of the AESKW module is shown in Figure 23.  Of course, the graphical user 
interface (GUI) can also be used to gain a visual understanding of the module function, as  
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Figure 23: Assertion-based test benches facilitate automatic iterative testing of modules. 
 
shown in Figure 24.  Using the GUI can be helpful for debugging but can be a hindrance 
to iterative testing.  Each of the implemented modules was successfully tested using 
assertion-based functional test benches. 
For integrated testing of the controller combined with modules, the controller test 
bench was written.  Since the KPM controller includes the BIST, the controller test bench 
was designed to take advantage of this.  When a new module was added to the controller, 
the BIST would also be updated.  Then, to test the new system, the test bench would 
initialize the BIST.  The new BIST logic then tested the new module code, and the test 
bench monitored the BIST return values for success or failure.  This technique eased the 
task of writing the test bench; since the test bench was able to test functionality at a high 
level, it was only necessary for it to check a small number of return values, as shown in 
Figure 25 and Figure 26. 
As the KPM controller was built, it was often necessary to test partially-
functioning versions.  Empty or reduced-behavior states were often added to the state 
machines, and assertions were useful in these instances to monitor when these states were 
being entered or exited.  Additionally, when the states needed to operate on a non-
existent module, a stub module was inserted into the design.  The stub modules define the 
interface for the module but do not fully define the behavior of the module. 
5.1.2 Cadence FormalCheck 
By applying formal verification tools such as Cadence FormalCheck, it is possible 
to guarantee that a design’s logic behaves as desired.  Several challenges exist, ensuring 
that formal techniques are not a verification panacea.  One problem is that these 
techniques suffer from state-space explosion, making it computationally infeasible to  
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Figure 24: Functional simulation with the GUI is useful for debugging module behavior. 
 
 
 
Figure 25: The top-level controller test bench only needs to check the BIST report bits. 
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Figure 26: The controller test bench only needs to check a single memory address and return vector. 
 
verify large designs.  This problem manifests itself especially when trying to verify a 
design’s data path.  A 32 or 64-bit vector can be too much for formal verification 
techniques to handle.  With the KPM controller, a number of 128, 256, and 571-bit 
vectors are used, so formal verification must be applied with care.   
There are a number of ways to limit the number of states applicable to a formal 
verification task.  One of these methods is simply partitioning the design into smaller 
verification tasks according the natural design hierarchy.  A complimentary method is to 
restrict the signals.  Some environmental restrictions are necessary for correct operation 
of the circuit, such as defining a clock and a reset.  Other restrictions might reflect the 
behavior of logic external to the design.  Furthermore, since control logic is the most 
likely place to find logic errors, data path calculations can be largely ignored.  Large 
arithmetic operands and results can be considered to be short vectors for the purpose of 
formal verification, and then the data flow verification task is relegated completely to 
functional verification.  All of these techniques were used in the verification of the KPM 
controller (Fields “Formal Verification,” 2005). 
FormalCheck is based on logical properties and queries.  Properties specify 
particular design behaviors, and queries link properties that are assumed with properties 
to be verified.  The properties rely on user-defined windows of interest, which consist of 
several conditions: enabling condition, fulfilling condition, and discharging condition.  A 
window is triggered by one event and released by another, and during the window some 
condition is examined.  Only the fulfilling condition is necessary – leaving off the 
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enabling condition implies that the window is initially enabled, and leaving off the 
discharging condition implies that the window is never discharged.  A user specifies an 
enabling condition using after or if_repeatedly.  Fulfilling conditions are specified with 
always, never, eventually, or eventually_always.  Discharging conditions are specified 
with unless and unless_after.  Semantically, these specifications are the same as standard 
English.   
Properties are used to specify two types of functional requirements: safety 
requirements and liveness requirements.  Safety requirements state that the design should 
never behave in certain ways, while liveness requirements state that the design should 
always be able to respond to certain stimuli. 
 One safety requirement is that the device should reach the ready state 
immediately after a reset is issued.  The requirement is triggered on a rising edge during 
which the reset signal is falling and the i_top_attn start signal is 0.  The requirement is 
that the top level state machine is always in the ready state for one cycle after the trigger 
event.  Because of the asynchronous reset and the way the timing is specified in this 
property, the enabling condition must include i_top_attn = 0 or else the state machine 
could advance immediately after the reset signal goes low.  This is defined as: 
property -create timely_startup { 
 after {  
  n2k_control:clk = rising and 
  n2k_control:rst = falling and 
  n2k_control:i_top_attn = 0    
 } 
 always {  
  n2k_control:state = ready  
 } 
 within -delay 0 -duration 1 { n2k_control:clk = rising } 
} 
 
 The main signaling from the KPM to the CPU is the assertion that processing has 
completed.  Thus, another safety requirement is that the “done bit” should only be 
asserted when processing actually has completed.  Processing has been completed when 
the top level state machine is “done”, and only in that state should the “done bit” 
n2k_control:o_top_dout(8) be written to CONTROL_ADDR_OUT.  This property is: 
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property -create only_done_bit_when_done { 
 never { 
  n2k_control:o_top_we = 1 and 
  @CONTROL_ADDR_OUT and 
  n2k_control:o_top_dout(8) = 1 
 } 
 unless { n2k_control:state = done }   
} 
 
 Since the control words to and from the host CPU are mutually exclusive, the 
KPM controller should never write to the CPU's word.  This is a third safety requirement, 
stated simply: 
property -create never_write_cpu_word { 
 never { 
  n2k_control:o_top_we = 1 and 
  @CONTROL_ADDR_IN 
 } 
} 
 
 Liveness requirements are used to ensure that the design cannot hang in a certain 
state.  The CPU should always be able to issue commands such that the KPM processes 
input and returns a result.  The return of the result is signaled by the assertion of the 
“done bit” in the CONTROL_ADDR_OUT memory location.  This property is checked 
by: 
property -create eventual_done_bit { 
 eventually {  
  n2k_control:o_top_we = 1 and 
  @CONTROL_ADDR_OUT and 
  n2k_control:o_top_dout(8) = 1 
 } 
} 
 
 The eventual_done_bit property could be fulfilled if the design were to hang in 
the done state, continually asserting the “done_bit”.  One way to be assured that this is 
not the case is to define a second liveness property, stating that the controller can always 
reach the ready state: 
property -create eventual_ready_state { 
 eventually { n2k_control:state = ready } 
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} 
 
Of course, if the reset were asserted, the controller would revert to the ready state.  
However, reset was defined to be constant after an initial pulse, so together the 
eventual_done_bit and eventual_ready_state requirements ensure that the controller will 
always be responsive to valid input. 
These safety and liveness properties were incorporated into queries and fully 
verified using Cadence FormalCheck.  Thus, the design is guaranteed to perform in 
accordance with the properties.  From the safety property verifications, it will never stall 
at reset, it will only signal the done bit when it has finished its processing, and it will 
never write into the host CPU’s restricted memory space.  From the liveness properties, it 
will always eventually notify the CPU of its completion, and it will always eventually be 
ready to process another requests for data. 
5.2 Synthesis Results 
The implementation was synthesized with Synplicity Synplify Pro targeting a 
Xilinx Virtex-II Pro XC2VP30 FPGA.  This FPGA contains 13,696 slices that each 
contain two storage elements and two function generators.  The device can be configured 
to offer up to 27,392 register bits and 27,392 look-up tables (LUTs) (Xilinx, 2005).  The 
resource usage is broken down by modules and shown in Table 4.  Note that the reported 
usage percentages were calculated by Synplify Pro and that hand-calculated values based 
on component usage and the Xilinx data sheet differ slightly. 
 The table shows the expected result that most of the sequential functionality takes 
place in the controller.  The controller has high register requirements because it is 
buffering long cryptographic vectors as they are read from memory or passed among the 
various modules.  This is expected since the design uses point-to-point connections to 
increase performance.  Using a bussed architecture would reduce the register 
requirements but result in a negative impact on performance. 
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Table 4: The KPM resource usage reported by synthesis for XC2VP30 is shown. 
 Register bits Register Usage LUTs LUT Usage 
Controller 15,888 53% 12,717 43% 
AES-256 1,047 2.05% 3,225 6.3% 
AESKW 1,042 2.04% 750 1.47% 
DRBG 4,092 8.00% 16,556 32.35% 
SHA-512 2,212 16.4% 5,397 10.55% 
Total 17,429 59% 39,315 133% 
 
The LUT usage of the controller, while not surpassing that of the combined 
modules, is also high.  The chief cause for this usage is the implementation of a number 
of shift registers to transfer data between the wide cryptographic buffers and the narrow 
memory bus.  This is an area-inefficient scheme whose only positive benefit is ease of 
specification, and it would be more efficient to implement only a single wide shift 
register to handle the needs of the many cryptographic buffers.  In addition to the 
repeated shift registers, though, the large number of checks required by the state 
machines contributes significantly to the LUT usage.   
 The DRBG module stands out among the modules, since it uses nearly a third of 
the device’s LUTs.  This is because of the very large modulus operation that is required 
by the DRBG block.  The binary division consumes a large amount of resources since it 
cannot be efficiently implemented in logic gates.  The division is also responsible for the 
relatively high register usage, since very wide registers are used to shift the intermediate 
division values. 
 Second to the DRBG module, the SHA-512 module uses more resources than the 
other cryptographic modules.  Unlike the modules with lower resource usages, this 
module operates on 1024-bit vectors.  These operations, though implemented efficiently, 
result in the high LUT usage.  The high register usage is a result of the buffering and 
padding operations needed to prepare input data for the core processing functions.   
 The estimated performance of the controller by itself is 68.4 MHz.  The critical 
path here is a result of passing through hierarchical state machines and then through a 
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wide shift register.  Once the implemented modules are added, then the estimated 
performance is 35.3 MHz, limited by the AES-256 module.  The AES-256 design has 
been prototyped on an older technology with 33 MHz performance, so this performance 
is in-line with what is expected when using the AES-256 module with Virtex-II 
technology.  The expected throughput, based on the AES-256 critical path and 28.6 
cycles per 128-bit word, is 150Mb/s. 
5.3 Post-synthesis Simulation 
In accordance with the FPGA design flow in Figure 14, the synthesis result was 
again simulated.  This post-synthesis simulation verifies that the synthesis tool correctly 
translated the design into a netlist, and it also includes logic delays, specified in the 
vendor’s component libraries.  Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the assertion-based test 
result and the BIST state transitions, respectively.  These outputs show that the post-
synthesis result operates correctly.   
For simulation, the synthesis tool outputs a structural Verilog design description.  
The existence of Verilog post-synthesis components and VHDL test bench and library 
components can be seen in both of the post-synthesis figures – Verilog components are 
represented by light blue ball icons, while VHDL components are represented by dark 
blue boxes.  Figure 27 shows the various modules, but the DSA module is missing 
because its stub architecture was optimized away by the synthesis tool.   
5.4 Place and Route Results 
Without the full implementation of the DSA and ECDH blocks, a full prototype 
cannot be tested.  However, the existing design can be run through the FPGA vendor 
place and route tools, resulting in a layout that is useful for visualization.  The design was 
fit into a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro XC2VP70 device, and the result is shown in Figure 29.  
The design as routed assumes that the internal block rams of the FPGA are used as the 
shared memory between the host CPU and the coprocessor.  All Virtex-II Pro devices 
include embedded PowerPC cores that are suitable for use as the host CPU.  However,  
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Figure 27: The assertion-based post-synthesis test bench completes successfully. 
 
 
Figure 28: The post-synthesis test bench waveform corroborates the assertion-based result. 
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Figure 29: The result of automatic placement shows the relative distribution of logic among the modules. 
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this requires the use of additional glue logic, perhaps an on-chip bus, and that logic is not 
included in the placed and routed design shown.   
 The placed and routed result is colorized to reflect the area usage of the various 
design components, and these results mirror those of the synthesis tool.  The controller 
takes up the majority of the chip, and the DRBG, AES-256, and SHA-512 are the largest 
cryptographic modules.  The KDF and AESKW modules are minimal, and their logic is 
mixed with the controller logic.  The DSA and ECDH modules are not highlighted since 
their stubs contribute negligibly to the resource usage. 
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6 Conclusion 
This work leads the way to the first hardware-based implementation of the KPM.  
Its development is a necessary step toward highly secure and flexible deployments of the 
N2K system.  This implementation provides the flexibility and ease-of-prototyping 
needed for prototypes to be developed and tested in user environments, and following 
these steps next-generation secure communications can be realized. 
6.1 Summary 
There is a clear need for improved computer security in the form of 
cryptographically-enforced role-based access control.  The Need2Know system aims to 
provide this increased security and enable secure communications for government, 
corporate, and personal entities.  Commensurate with these goals, an implementation of 
the N2K KPM must be designed with consideration of a number of tradeoffs: low time-
to-market, high throughput, low power, low cost, feature flexibility, and implementation 
security.  Considering the merits of various approaches, an FPGA implementation was 
selected. 
A tightly-integrated coprocessor architecture was chosen for the FPGA 
implementation.  This architecture implements all of the algorithms required by the top-
level KPM algorithm and includes a hardware controller, so the host CPU needs only to 
communicate at a high level of abstraction with the controller.  Various cryptographic 
algorithms are implemented as modules, and the modules have direct links to the 
controller.  The controller directs their actions and is in turn controlled by the host CPU 
by means of shared dual-port RAM.  To minimize the area requirements, each module is 
instantiated only once, and the KPM controller is responsible for switching control of the 
modules when required.  The implementation includes encryption, decryption, and BIST 
modes of operation.  The BIST includes standard test vectors to verify the operation of 
the cryptographic modules and the overall function of the controller. 
Verification was performed iteratively throughout the design process.  The 
cryptographic modules were functionally verified individually before being integrated 
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into the controller; the controller was both functionally verified with the modules and 
formally verified on its own.  The implemented modules and controller passed all the 
verification tests, though a full implementation of the KPM is not possible since elliptic 
curve arithmetic functions for the DSA and ECDH modules have yet to be implemented. 
Synthesis results for the KPM controller and modules were presented, showing a 
breakdown of the resource usage for various components and the expected performance 
of the coprocessor.  The device required more area than originally expected, using more 
than 100% of the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro XC2VP30 device.  However, the performance 
expectations were within range of previously prototyped modules. 
6.2 Future Work 
Several techniques are possible to optimize the performance of the 
implementation.  For one, the bandwidth between the host CPU and coprocessor is 
typically a bottleneck in system performance.  While the message cache is an 
improvement over single-word passing, other schemes hold the potential for higher 
throughput.  For example, tiered memory caches could allow one memory cache to be 
operated on by the coprocessor while the host CPU was filling the other one.  Similarly, a 
shared FIFO buffer would allow parallelization of data passing and data processing. 
Another option for improving performance involves the connections between the 
modules and the controller.  The point-to-point connections of the modules to the 
controller allow the potential for maximum performance, but there might be other more 
efficient means of achieving good performance.  A hierarchy of busses, for instance, 
might make sense, or simply a 128 or 256-bit bus.  Aside from the additional latency, one 
downside of these techniques is that the pre-existing modules would need to be wrapped 
in order to support communication across the bus.   
Still other performance gains can be realized if the area-savings requirements are 
relaxed.  For instance, pipelining the slowest and most frequently-used module, AES-
256, would increase the total system performance.  Also, modules could be replicated to 
increase the exploitable parallelism.  The CLS processing is a good candidate for parallel 
processing, since a number of shared values will need to be calculated from independent 
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CLSs.  As another option, the entire data path could be pipelined, though this mainly 
makes sense in a multi-user or multi-connection computing environment where multiple 
packets are waiting for processing. 
One of the stated design considerations was low-power, and FPGA devices are 
known be inefficient in this respect.  Nevertheless, there are several techniques that can 
be examined and implemented in order to reduce the power consumption of an FPGA 
device.  Multiple clock domains and/or clock gating, for instance, can help to minimize 
the power consumption when the coprocessor is not in use.   
Finally, since the implementation is designed to secure data, it needs to include 
defense mechanisms against all known security attacks, both active and passive.  
However, design up to this point has focused mainly on performance and flexibility.  
Effort should also be spent on thwarting timing attacks, differential power analysis 
attacks, and temperature-based attacks.  Perhaps the BIST can be extended to more-fully 
examine the coprocessor’s behavior at regular intervals and to shut down the device when 
an undesired intrusion is detected.  Also, physical security is important, and logic 
integration with tamper-detecting packaging should be investigated.   
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